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It was with great pleasure that a sub-committee of the
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws had the
privilege of discussing the Negotiable Instruments Law with
Professor James Barr Ames, the Dean of the Harvard
Law School.
He had kindly consented, on request, to meet with us, -at
the annual session, at Saratoga, in August last.
It was with no less pleasure that, after two or three days
re-examination of the Act, with reference to the criticisms of
the Dean, we were able to report that, in our judgment, no
change in the Act was needed and to have that report, after
full explanation of the points discussed, unanimously approved
by the Conference.
As the Dean has, with great courtesy, given us in advance
substantially the same strictures to be published in the Harvard
Law Review for December, 1900, it was suggested by members
of the Conference that I should state in reply the reasons why
the Conference did not adopt the views of the Dean. Finding
that the Harvard Law Review could not publish a reply until
late in the winter and that the YALE LAW JOURNAL could do
so in January, I have availed myself of the early opportunity
afforded of publishing it in this journal.
It is with diffidence that I undertake to reply to legal criti-
cisms from such a source and upon such a subject. The Dean
of the Harvard Law School has so long been, not merely an
expert, but an authority, on this subject, that I would not
rashly volunteer to attack his positions. But, sometimes the
point of view is quite as important as extensive knowledge and
I am constrained to believe that so keen a controversialist is
somewhat affected by that "gaudium certaminis" which the
most open-minded advocate cannot wholly resist. Then too,
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if it is a question of experts, nearly all of them disagree with
the Dean, on the main points at issue, as I shall try to show.
If it is a question largely of practice and experience as a trier
of cases, Professor Ames has none-while on the other hand, on
all questions of custom and convenience, the practical knowledge
of the hundred lawyers, and more, who framed the Negotiable
Instruments Law, and the hundred bankers who adopted it,
would seem to quite offset the mere conclusions of erudition.
One who, like Professor Ames, can approach the considera-
tion of a legal subject from the purely academic point of view,
unembarrassed by any preconceptions derived from practice at
the bar, has a certain advantage in that the matter may pre-
sent itself to his view in scientific arrangement and symmetry
from the first. Yet on the other hand, the want of just that
everyday familiarity with commercial affairs and business men,
which every lawyer in considerable practice necessarily acquires,
sometimes unfits the mere scholar or book lawyer to see things
as others see them, and may make him give undue weight to
what is really of little or no importance. Accustomed to deal
only with theoretical questions and to measure law by ideal
standards, such a man may demand a fulness of expression
which amounts to prolixity, and discern obscurities where to
the ordinary lawyer or merchant everything would seem plain
and simple.
But such questions are notsettled by the "Rule of Thumb,"
or a majority vote, and the Negotiable Instruments Act must
stand on its own merits. It is a great good fortune to all con-
cerned to have it tested by so great an expert.
Now as to the tests.
It is my purpose to devote this paper to answering the
specific objections submitted in the Dean's article, grouping
them as far as possible for the sake of brevity.
As five of the more important strictures are equally strict-
ures of the English Act, which has been the Law of England
since 1880, the language being the same in both acts, the five
can conveniently be considered together.
They are criticisms of sections 3-2, 9-5, 9-3, 29, 70. These
sections in the Negotiable Instruments Law contain the follow-
ing propositions:
(a) That a promise is not rendered conditional by "a
statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instru-
ment."
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(b) That an instrument is payable to bearer though it is
"payable to the order of a fictitious person"-or payable to
bearer;
(c) "Where the only or last indorsement is in blank."
(d) That "an accommodation party is one who hassigned
the instrument as maker, acceptor or indorser without receiv-
ing value therefor and for the purpose of lending his name to
some other person."
(e) "That presentment for payment is not necessary in or-
der to charge the person primarily liable on the instrument."
Answer. First, as a matter of authority, I know of no text
book on bills and notes or any encyclopoedia of law that does
not hold the above propositions to be axioms of commercial
law. They are sustained by a multitude of cases. Secondly,
as to the inconveniences therefrom apprehended by the Profes-
sor, it is enough to say that none such have apparently arisen
in England during the experience of twenty years, nor are any
such apprehended by the bankers of this country, who after giv-
ing the matter very critical attention, have given their cordial
approval of the law. Perhaps a more specific discussion of two
of these five strictures, applicable to both the English and
American Acts, will answer for a more minute criticism of the
others. One is the critique on Sec. 29, and is as follows:
"Sec. 29 defines an accommodation party as one who
has signed the instrument 'without receiving value therefor
and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person.'
By this definition, one who has received a commission, which
is certainly value, for lending the credit of his name, would not
be an accommodation party. The words, 'without receiving
value therefor and' should be cancelled as inaccurate and mislead-
ing." The only difference I have been able to find between the
language of the two Negotiable Instruments Laws and that of
the ordinary definitions is that more of the text books and
cases seem to use the words "without consideration" than the
words "without value received." But as these expressions are
made synonymous by the definitions in the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, Sec. 191, all the text books and modern cases agree
with the Negotiable Instruments Act, as to absence of consid-
eration. The definition in the Negotiable Instruments Law is
the definition given in the new edition of the Ameican and
English Encyclopmdia of Law, Vol. I, pages 335-6:
This article is a very full and complete discussion of the sub-
ject, containing fifty-eight pages on accommodation parties
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alone. Daniel is to the same effect. 1 Daniel189. So also
Tiedman, Sec. 158. Byles on Bills, star paging 131. 2 Ran-
dolph 472. Norton's Horn-Book (1900) 176. Bigelow, second
edition, cites the definition given by the Negotiable Instruments
Law as the true definition. On page 336 of the second Encyclo-
psedia, supra, the language is, "there must be an absence of con-
sideration between the accommodated and the accommodation
party." Rawle's Bouvier's definition is "Bills or notes made,
accepted or indorsed without any consideration." Not only do
the opinions of the judges, text books, statutes, codes, and the
law dictionaries agree on this point, but it is worthy of notice
that the last leading lexicons agree exactly with the definition
of the Negotiable Instruments Law so far as absence of consid-
eration is concerned. (See last Standard and Webster ad
verbum.) The only reason given for the overthrow of all these
authorities is an illustration intended apparently to demon-
strate the difficulty of showing what is value and what is not,
but which in reality indicates value on its face. What is there
"inaccurate and misleading" in a definition universally adopted?
Sec. 3-2, which provides that "an order or promise is
not rendered conditional by the addition of a statement of the
transaction, which gives rise to the instrument" is objected to
as "unmeaning" and "nullifying several decisions." Here, as
before, the textbooks and modern cases are almost unani-
mously against the Dean.
The instance cited by him of a note "given as collateral se-
curitv" contains notice upon its face that the note is not anun-
conditional promise to pay, but conditional upon the non-
payment of the principal debt. (See Sec. 1, Par. 2).
The provision was intended to cover such transactions
as a "chattel note," in order to unify the law, which has
been held differently, as Dean Ames shows in the cases
which he cites. The decision in New York, cited by
him, to prove that the Negotiable Instruments Law
did not cover such a note, Third Bank v. Spring, 28 N. Y. Mis.
9, has since been reversed, s. c. 63 N. Y., Supp. 410, although
the Appellate Division did not base its reversal on the terms of
the act. The latter decision, therefore, implies that the terms of
the act have not changed the law in New York. How the pro-
vision is "obscure, inartistic and useless," as claimed by the
critic, does not appear. That it is not very "obscure" seems
certain or some question would have arisen under it in twenty
years. Good, clear, plain English would seem to be "artistic"
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enough for the language of a statute. A single line which
settles many discordant decisions would not ordinarily be
termed "useless" or, on any interpretation, "mischievous."
The other three propositions, "b, c and f," can easily be
tested in the same way by reference to the same standard au-
thorities. In fact I do not see how any good practical commer-
cial lawyer could regard them as questionable. I shall notlum-
ber up this reply with scores of citations of cases. The
text books on these plain propositions are fully supported
by the cases cited by them.
But I must condense. Of the sections of the law criticized
by the Dean other than "a" and "d," already considered at
length, I can best justify the conclusions of the Conference by
repeating, as near as can be remembered, the offhand answers
-given at the time of the friendly discussion aforesaid. The
fullest notes are those of Chief Justice Stiness of Rhode Island,
who was chairman of the sub-committee and has favored me
with the privilege of using them. I have used them freely, mak-
ing only such necessary changes as any new point in the Dean's
Harvard article suggests. I take these notes in the order of
the criticisms made by the Dean. The general soundness and
practical wisdom of these answers, or rather of the proposi-
tions they defend, will; I believe, be confirmed by a careful ex-
amination of the best authorities.
Sec. 36-2-3. The point here made is that there is no differ-
ence between an agent and a trustee, because the agent would
collect for the benefit of his principal. Hence "2 and 3 should
be consolidated." All agents are, in a sense, trustees, because
they are ultimately accountable to the principal. But all agents
are not technically trustees. The distinction between an agent
and a trustee is embodied here for the purpose of relieving a
plaintiff from proving an actual trust, which would be neces-
sary under Professor Ames' proposed substitute. A general
agent might be authorized to use money quite differently
from a trustee.
Sec. 137. This section holds the destruction of a bill, or a
refusal to return it, equivalent to an acceptance. He concedes
that a drawee, so misconducting, should be liable for a conver-
sion. A destruction or refusal to deliver a thing is, in law, a
conversion. The Dean says this section makes a refusal to ac-
cept, an acceptance, and adds, "such a perversion of language
would be strange enough anywhere, but in a deliberately framed
code is well-nigh inexplicable." Surely this .is a mere play upon
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words. There has .been no "refusal to accept," simply a "re-
fusal to return within twenty-four hours." This provision was
adopted in New York by statute fifty years ago.
Sec. 9-3, is criticized because it holds a note, payable to a
fictitious or non-existing person, as payable to bearer. If one
issues his note to a fictitious person, why should it not be
treated as a note to bearer, for there is no one who can indorse
it? Surely it is more logical to hold that anote, whichpurports
to be payable to a person, when there is no such person and the
maker knows it, must have been intended to be payable to
bearer, than to hold that somebody must assume the name of
such fictitious person, and make a falie indorsement in order to
give title to the note. The case supposed by Dean Ames, of a
thief stealing such a note and the consequent hardship upon
the maker of liability on the note as payable to bearer, when
he would not be liable, because of incompleteness, if an indorse-
ment were required, would be a rare one. His criticism seems
to imply that the Act should cover rare and imaginary excep-
tions rather than serve the commendable purpose, which he
concedes that the section has, of providing for common cases,
such as notes payable to unincorporated associations, estates
of deceased persons, and the like. Under his proposed substi-
tute, if the maker completes the indorsement the same result
would follow as without it. In either case, the familiar rule,
that where one of two innocent parties must suffer loss, it
should fall on him who has given the occasion for it, seems to
be far short of "cruel injustice." There has been a variety of
decisions in regard to stolen notes. 1 Dan. Neg. Inst., chap.
26, 4th ed. This section would result in a definite rule; and,
being in the line of aiding negotiability, a rule which puts the
loss on a man who makes notes, for fun or fraud, and leaves
them so that they can be stolen and issued, rather than on one
who, in due course, has taken a maker's written promise to
pay, seems to be a just one. The honesty of one's holding can
always be examined.
See. 9-5. The first objection is that it covers a note payable
to B and indorsed by C in blank. Such a construction is im-
possible. The section clearly means that a note duly trans-
ferred and indorsed in blank, is then payable to bearer; a prop-
osition too clear for argument, so long as the indorsement re-
mains in that form. As Dean Ames says: "It ceases to be pay-
able to bearer if afterwards indorsed specially." The reason
why such a rule is "illogical and undesirable" is not clear.
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The third objection is that if, after a special indorsement, the
note is transferred by delivery, the transferee cannot sue parties
prior to the special indorser in his own name, but only in the
name of his assignor. This is an assumption not contained in
the Act. On the contrary, the effect of Par. 40, which author-
izes a transfer by delivery, seems to give the transferee a right
to sue in his own name, otherwise the note would not be "ne-
gotiated" within the meaning of the Act. The only limitation
is that the person indorsing specially is liable as indorser only
to such holders as make title through his indorsement. The
proposed substitute appears to mean exactly what the Act
means, since Par. 48 gives the right to strike out any indorse-
ment not necessary to title. See also Par. 34 of Negotiable In-
struments Law.
Sec. 20. The case supposed in the objection fails to show
injustice. It is, if A signs a note as agent for B, mistakenly be-
lieving that he has authority, and B, a bankrupt, denies the
agency, the payee should only recover from A what he might
have recovered from B, the bankrupt, whereas the Act makes
A liable for the face of the note. The plain answer is that one
signing a note as agent for another should know and be able
to show his authority. If he signs without authority, he alone
in fact, and so in law, is the maker of the note, and he should
be held liable accordingly.
See. 22, as to an infant's indorsement, is the same as in the
English Act, except that the words "passes the property
therein" are used in place of the words "entitles the holder to
receive payment of the bill and to enforce it against any other
party thereto." As the the scope of the Act is confined to nego-
tiable instruments, it does not otherwise affect the law relating
to infants. Hence, the words of the two acts are equivalent
in meaning, with the advantage of conciseness in the
American Act.
Sec. 34 follows the English Act. Dean Ames puts the ques-
tion whether if the payee writes: "I assign this note to B, or
I guarantee to B the payment of this note," he would be liable
on his assignment,or guaranty, and regrets that the Act does
not answer the question. The liability of a party on a peculiar
indorsement, which is outside of negotiability, must be settled
by a court.
Sec. 37-2. The supposed injustice of this sub-section, in
case the indorsement was for value to the indorsee in trust for
a third person, is not apparent.
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See. 40 is claimed to be repugnant to Par. 9-5, but this is
not so. 9-5 declares a note to be payable to bearer when its
last indorsement is in blank; 40 relates to a note where the
last indorsement is special, and provides that it may then be
transferred by delivery, in order to cover cases of good faith
where title is frequently passed in that way, by persons igno-
rant of mercantile usage. In the case of a theft of a note from
a special indorsee, which Dean Ames supposes, what harm can
result? As before stated, the section validates a transfer by de-
livery, without the indorsement of the special indorsee, and so
gives the holder a right to sue in his own name. This plainly
implies proof of delivery from the owner, which would protect
the parties in case of loss or theft of the note.
The first sentence of Sec. 40 is as follows :
"Where an instrument, payable to bearer, is indorsed spe-
cially, it may nevertheless be further negotiated by delivery;
but the person indorsing specially is liable as indorser to only
such holders as make title through his indorsement."
See. 9-5 reads:
" The instrument is payable to bearer: * * * when the
only or last indorsement is in blanik."
The Dean's stricture on the assumed repugnancy of these
two sections begins, "See. 40 * * * * provides that an in-
strument indorsed in blank, although subsequently indorsed
specially, may nevertheless be further negotiated by delivery."
But as a comparison shows, Sec. 40 does not refer to an
"instrument indorsed in blank" but to an instrument
"payable to bearer." The supposed inconsistency of the two
sections arises entirely from the mistaken quotation of the
learned Dean.
The first sentence 6f Sec. 49 is as follows:
"Where the holder of an instrument payable to his order
transfers it for value, without indorsing it, the transfer vests
in the transferee such title as the transferrer had therein, and
the transferee acquires in addition, the right to have the in-
dorsement of the transferrer." This section gives the transferee
such title as the transferrer had and the right to have an in-
dorsement.
This is quite right. The holder in such a case, not taking
title in the usual way by indorsement, may well be charged
with notice of any defect in the title to the note, or of equities
between the parties. The clause giving the right to require an
indorsement could only be enforced in equity, upon proof of an
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agreement to that effect. Hence, the words added in the Col-
orado statute, "if omitted by accident or mistake" were un-
necessary. An indorsement so enforced would complete the
title and thus cover the case of hardship which Dean Ames sup-
poses. All cases of possible equities cannot be covered by leg-
islation.
Sec. 64 provides that one, not otherwise a party to an in-
strument, who puts his signature thereon before delivery, is
liable as an indorser. It isto cover cases where persons put
their names on the back of notes before delivery, and where
they have been variously held to be indorsers, guarantors and
joint makers. The section makes the rule that he shall be liable
to all subsequent parties. Dean Ames says he should be liable
to the maker or drawer whom he has accommodated with his
signature, in cases where the maker or drawer is the payee.
Apparently, his idea is that if he is not liable to the drawer-
payee, no title can be passed by the latter. But sub-section 2
makes the party liable as indorser to all parties subsequent to
the maker or drawer. The Dean's proposed substitute would
defeat the purpose of the Act, which is to put the irregular
party into the place of the indorser, by making him practically
a joint promoter, because his signature would precede that of
the indorser.
See. 65 makes a person, who transfers a note by delivery or
by a qualified indorsement, warrant certain things. It then
says: "But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the war-
ranty extends in favor of no holder other than the immediate
transferee." Dean Ames objects that this last clause makes the
waranty of the indorser, which is that of a vendor, run in favor
of all subsequent holders, which he says is "an original inven-
tion of the Negotiable Instruments Act. But this is its only
merit."
The Dean is unjust to himself. In 2 Ames, Cases on Bills
and Notes, Index under head of "Indorser without recourse,"
840, 882, is this syllabus: "An indorsement without recourse,
like a transfer by delivery merely, being, in substance, a sale,
the indorser is responsible to the indorsee and subsequent hold-
ers for the validity of the title and the genuineness of the in-
strument which he purports to sell." The selected case is Ble-
then v. Lovering, 58 Me. 240. It was not a case of subsequent
parties, but the long note appended to it does not in this re-
spect distinguish the case from the syllabus in the Index.
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The same rule is stated so far as relates to a qualified in-
dorsement in Fourth Am. & Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, sec-
ond edition, 481, in almost the same words, and in 1 Daniel on
Negotiable Instruments, fourth editidn, Par. 670, the language
is: "The holder may sue the indorser." This is enough to show
that the framers of the Negotiable Instruments Law must dis-
claim the credit of the invention which is accorded to them.
In the new Norton on Bills and Notes, (horn-book series)
page 167, the editor gives the sub-section in question from the
Negotiable Instruments Law as the true law on qualified in-
dorsements, quoting 2Ames, Cases on Bills and Notes, 840,882,
as his authority. He seems to doubt however whether, among
the conflicting cases, it was the law before made so by the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law. He also thinks that the law laid
down by Professor Ames in the passage above quoted that the
warranty of the transferrer by delivery also extends to subse-
quent parties, while not accepted as law elsewhere, ought to be
the law. So that, instead of being guilty of the heinous crime
of "novelty," the Negotiable Instruments Law is, on this mat-
ter, more conservative than either the Norton Horn-Book or
Dean Ames' leading cases, when it lays down the rule, that
"when negotiation is by delivery only, the warranty extends
in favor of no holder other than the immediate transferee."
The reasonableness of making a distinction between a trans-
ferrer by delivery and an indorser without recourse, because in
one case the name is on the paper and in the other is not, may
or may not be doubtful. Norton's Horn-Book, Sec. 79, says
they stand "much upon the same footing;" Dean Ames says
their liability is identical. But that a certain and definite rule
should be adopted, nobody can doubt. I
I On this point I have cited chiefly the new Norton Horn-Book, on Bills and
Notes, just edited by Mr. Francis B. Tiffany, not only because it is one of the
ablest and most interesting discussions on this special point, but because the
editor seems to have taken most of the new matter in the book equally from
the Negotiable Instruments Law and Professor Ames' Leading Cases on Bills
and Notes. The preface says: "The present editor wishes to express his great
obligation to Professor Ames, whose Index and Summary at the end of the
cases, unquestionably the most important contribution to the subject that has
been made in America, he has constantly consulted." It is hence, doubly reas-
suring to note that with so orthodox an authority for "constant" reference, as
the Leading Cases on Bills and Notes, Mr. Tiffany quotes a score of definitions
bodily, from the Negotiable Instruments Law, and so far as I have observed,
does not seem to disagree with its statement of law on any point.
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Sec. 66 is more explicit and does make a change in the
law, but it is in the line of aiding negotiability. It follows
the English Act (Par. 55) in holding an indorser liable to a
holder in due course, as to genuineness and regularity, and
extends the liability only as to the warranty that the note
was valid at the time of his indorsement. As a note usually
gets its strength from the names of its indorsers, it seems to be
just that the warranty should be included, if, indeed, it really
adds anything to the English Act.
Sec. 68 treats joint-payers and indorsers, who indorse, as
indorsing jointly and severally. Theoretically, this may, as
the Dean says, "seem to be a blunder." But, practically, it
is a convenience in suing, and was, doubtless, inserted for
that purpose.
Sec. 70 provides that presentment for payment is notneces-
sary to charge the person primarily liable on the instrument.
The section was intended to apply to the maker of anote, who,
of course, is liable if he does not pay according to its tenor.
But, the Dean says, "it should except the cases of bank notes
and certificates of deposits." In view of the fact that no per-
son would be likely to bring a suit on such instruments when
he could get the money at the bank, and the further fact that
no harm could come to the promisor, excepting as to costs
which are in most, if not all'the States, subject to the discretion
of the court, the objection does not seem to be practical.
Sec. 119-4 provides that an instrument is discharged by an
act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of
money. The objection is that if the holder of a note accepts a
horse in satisfaction, before maturity, and then transfers the
note, the maker is still liable. The section evidently relates to
acts between the parties. If the maker allows his note to re-
main outstanding, and so to be transferred, of course he should
be held liable.
Sec. 120-3 discharges a person secondarily liable by the dis-
charge of a prior party. This too, evidently, means some act
between the parties. The law has long been settled that the
discharge of the liability of a bankrupt maker of a note. does
not affect the liability of the other parties on the note. It is
generally held that the statuLte of limitations against an in-
dorser runs, not necessarily from the date of the note, but from
the time when the indorser's liability accrues. When, therefore,
the language of sub-section 3 is used (exactly as given in a
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number of the text-books), it of course refers to a discharge
by the holder and not a discharge by act of the law, as the
whole context, referring to acts of the parties and not to any
acts of the law, clearly indicates. Thus Randolph, second
edition, See. 769, says "the release of a prior indorsement dis-
charges subsequent indorsers," assuming of course their release
by the holder. That this is the natural meaning and inter-
pretation of sub-section 3, Sec. 120, is fairly inferrible from this
fact. Ten books on commercial paper have been published
since the Negotiable Instruments Law was legislatively
adopted. All of them treat more or less fully of that law;
Huffcut, Randolph, Bigelow, Norton, generally, and Selover and
Crawford and the special books on the New York and Col-
orado Acts, treating of that Act alone. Not one of these ten
authors intimates that sub-section 3 has changed the law in
the slightest degree. In all the reports of the various Commis-
sioners to their respective States, elaborately stating every
change of law made by the Negotiable Instruments Law, no
allusion is made to sub-section 3.
It is not necessary in this instance to invoke the aid of the
rule of law stated in Sutherland on Statutory Construction,
Sec. 156, that codes which condense and reaffirm in general, the
rules of the common law, do not repeal the exceptions to
these rules which they reaffirm; or the similar doctrine in End-
lich on Statutes, sections 127-205, that in statutes orrevisions
condensing or in general re-stating the common law, no change
is presumed except by the clearest and most imperative im-
plication.2 How far this doctrine is carried in England, in re-
gard to the Bills of Exchange Act is shown in the case of Bank
of England v. Vagliano, L. R. 1891, Appeal Cases, page 144.
But were this doctrine invoked the simplest application of the
rule or of Sec. 196 would at once relieve the sub-section in
question of the misinterpretation put upon it by the Dean.
Nevertheless our critic, whose adjectives here and there are
surprisingly vigorous, describes this aphorism of the Law
2 Because of the necessity of preserving this presumption in all its integ-
rity, the sub-committee declined to accept some slight changes proposed by the
Dean, such as adding to sub-section 120-3 the words, "bytheholder." Itwould
be (1) assuming a doubt where we had no doubt, and (2) assuming the doc-
trine from Sutherland and Endlich, supra, not to be true. A doctrine without
strict adherence to which codes would have to be as long as text-books.
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Merchant as, "themost mischievously revolutionary provision
of the new code." 3
As to sub-sections 5 and 6 of Sec. 120, the objection of inac-
curacy is based upon the case of an accommodation drawer or
indorser, because he says that the authorities are unanimous
against the discharge of the party accommodated. Undoubt-
edly that is so, and it is difficult to see how the law could be
construed to cover such a case. The law is intended to set out
the legal liability on the instrument, as such, in the due course
of commercial transactions. It could never be held to mean
that a party who had paid money for another's accommoda-
tion could not, at law, if not on the instrument, recover it
back. That is a matter between the parties, entirely outside of
the effect of the instrument in the hands of a holder.
Sec. 175 is the same as in the English Act, and whatever
may have been the difference in English decisions, it was, doubt-
less, deliberately adopted, and certainly it seems to be just. One
who pays for the honor of the drawer is as much an accommo-
dation party as the accommodation acceptorand has no equity
superior to that of the latter. But even if Mr. Chalmers and
Mr. Crawford are wrong in preferring the law of Lords Ken-
yon and Erskine to that of Lord Loughborough, and Malins
V. C., now that Lord Kenyon's ruling is the law of Great Brit-
ain and has been followed in several of the States (see cases
cited in note 2, page 499, vol.4 of second edition of Am. & Bng.
Ency. of Law) and as uniformity is one of the main objects of
the Negotiable Instruments Law, no mistakeis made in leaving
Sec. 175 as it stands.
Sec. 186. The objection is that, under Par. 89, upon pre-
sentment and dishonor notice must be given to the drawer of a
check or he will be discharged. Suppose it is so, technically,
with reference to the check itself. What is the harm ? The
debt is not discharged, except for laches. The holder can sue
on his debt just the same as he could have done before the
check was given. In some States a check is not held to be
8 The reasons attributed by the Dean for one or two of the changes of the
law, made in the Negotiable Instruments Law are, I think, misapprehensions.
I expected to have received from Mr. Crawford, the draftsman, a paper stating
the real grounds for such changes, in his own mind, but pressure of business
on his part has prevented him from rendering any assistance during the brief
time allowed for the preparation of this article, and the same is true of my
colleagues on the committee. So the responsibility for any heresies in this
paper must rest on my own shoulders.
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enough of a negotiable instrument to sustain an action. It is
held as an order, with no promise to pay. The section seems
to be harmless in any view.4
So much by way of comment on the criticisms of the Dean.
It is quite possible that on some of the more technical and
academic criticisms we have above discussed, the weight of
authority or the true theory of the Law Merchant may be on
the side of the critic. But let any candid reader carefully go
over the "salutary changes" and "settlements of controverted
questions" (and he might have added twice as many more) so
admirably stated by the Dean in the commencement of his arti-
cle, and the defects he assumes (if they are defects) are like
spots on the sun. It takes an expert to see them, and he must
use glasses at that.
In conclusion, our critic remarks that "if the preceding crit-
icisms are well founded, the errors and imperfections in the
Negotiable Instruments Law are so numerous and so serious
that, notwithstanding its many merits, its adoption by fifteen
States must be regarded as a misfortune." May we not say in
replythat if the Dean's criticisms are notwell founded, especially
if, in fact, they have nopractical basis at all, its speedy adoption
by all of the States would be, as Lord Herschell has expressed
it, "a boon to the commercial communities of both nations."
The critic relieves the severity of his adverse conclusion
by stating that the Commissioners made a mistake innot secur-
ing an abundance of competent criticism, both public and
private, from widely different sources, before issuing with their
sanction the final draft of the proposed law. It is enough to
state in replythat no statute in the English language, so far as
I know,has receiveda titheof the elaborate work laid out onthe
Negotiable Instruments Law. I have described before in this
journal (6 YALE LAW JOURNAL, February, 1897, page 132) how
the preparation of the original law involved the work of more
than one hundred trained lawyers, the co-operation of the mer-
4 One would like to accept the challenge on page 244 in the Dean's article
on the true theory on which a code on negotiable instruments should be made.
Although this to be sure is rather a criticism of Chalmers and Herschell, Sel-
borne and Bramwell, than of Mr. Crawford and the Conference. One would
also liketo explain why the subject of "Conflict of Laws" and some other sub-
jects suggested by the Dean as omissions, "Marring the symmetry of the new
code" were properly omitted in so short and compact a statute, which it was
hoped would be adopted by all the States and so leave much less inter-State
conflict. But the space given me does not permit.
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cantile community for years in its evolution, and its critical con-
sideration by both Houses of Parliament. In this country, it
hashad the criticism of lawyers inthe Commissions fromthirty-
two States, who had it in consideration for more than a year
during its preparation, and of leading text writers and teachers
on the subject of bills and notes, including from Massachusetts
alone Professors Bigelow, Williston, and Bennett, the well-
known law writer, Leonard A. Jones, and the author of "Amer-
ican Statute Law," Mr. F. J. Stimson.
Six months before its adoption, copies were sent to many
of the law schools (it was supposed to all), and to all of the
known writers on bills and notes in the country. It has been
adopted as a text-book in several law schools. It has been
recommended for adoption by the Supreme Courts of South
Carolina and Rhode Island in their opinions, before it was
adopted by their Legislatures, and so far as I know it has yet
to meet its first adverse criticism from any of the Courts in the
seventeen extensive jurisdictions where it has been adopted.
It has been critically examined and thereafter recommended by
the very able committees of the New York City Bar Associa-
tion and the Pennsylvania Bar Association, and by the Judic-
iary Committees of over twenty States. With this unqualified
indorsement of its value, is it unreasonable to anticipate its
acceptance before many years by all of the States of the Union?
But wherever passed, it should be passed without any alter-
ation whatever, exactly like the original code recommended by
the Commissioners, word for word. Otherwise, the discrep-
ancies of supposed uniformity would be almost as bad as the
present diversity. Once passed, it should not be changed until
some Court of authority has indicated the desirability of a
change, or some convention of bankers or merchants has
indicated where the demands of modern business require
a change.
